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Abstract 
 
An Adaptive Measurement Protocol for Fine-Grained 
Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic 
Modules 
 
Vishnuvardhan Venkatramani Iyer, MSE 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisor:  Ali Yilmaz 
 
An adaptive measurement protocol is presented to increase effectiveness of fine-
grained electromagnetic side-channel analysis (EM SCA) attacks that attempt to extract the 
information that is unintentionally leaked from physical implementations of cryptographic 
modules. Because measured fields vary with probe parameters as well as the data being 
encrypted, identifying the optimal configurations requires searching among a large number 
of possible configurations. The proposed protocol is a multi-step acquisition that 
corresponds to a greedy search in a 4-D configuration space consisting of probe’s on-chip 
coordinates, orientation, and number of signals acquired. This 4-D space can be extended 
to a 6-D space by repeating the protocol for different probe sizes and heights. This approach 
is presented as an alternative to current fine-grained EM SCA techniques that perform 
exhaustive full-chip scans to isolate information leaking locations. To demonstrate the 
feasibility of the approach, the protocol is tested by performing EM SCA attacks for 
 v 
different configurations and identifying the best attack configuration for two realizations 
of the advanced encryption standard (AES), subject to the precision of the measurement 
equipment. It is found that the protocol requires ~20× to ~25× less acquisition time 
compared to an exhaustive search for the optimal attack configuration.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction   
Physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms are prone to unintentional 
information leakage through observations of their EM emanations, dynamic power 
consumption, heat, vibrations, etc. In computer security, these are referred to as side 
channels; throughout this thesis, the analysis of side-channel signals to recover information 
is called a side-channel analysis (SCA) attack. The vulnerability of mathematically robust 
cryptographic algorithms to SCA attacks has been repeatedly demonstrated in the last two 
decades [1]-[6].  
This thesis focuses on EM SCA attacks that are based on observing and analyzing 
EM emanations from cryptographic chips, which are closely related to power SCA attacks 
that monitor and analyze their power consumption. While the source of information 
leakage through both power and EM side channels is the data-dependent switching of  
Figure 1: (a) Coarse-grained attack on a microcontroller running Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) [7]. (b) fine-grained attack on an FPGA running Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
[4]. 
              
(a)                                                                                  (b)                                                 
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transistors in the CMOS logic [5], [6], the relative vulnerability of a chip to either type of 
attack depends on a large number of factors, including the measurement equipment, the 
chip’s environment, and the availability of external connections. In general, near-field EM 
emanations provide an effective, non-invasive avenue to recover critical information from 
a chip and are difficult to counter without incurring significant overheads. This is partly 
because the location of on-chip leakages can be isolated and confounding signals from 
other sources be avoided by using EM probes. Moreover, the speed and potency of the EM 
SCA attacks can be increased by using scanning probes that automatically search for highly 
vulnerable configurations as in this thesis or by placing multiple sensors near the chip. The 
lack of direct sensor contact with the chip also complicates implementations of 
countermeasures and calls for novel countermeasures. For example, [8] proposed to 
integrate LC oscillators onto cryptographic chip designs and detect the presence of a nearby 
EM probe by the shifts in oscillation frequencies. This approach relies on inductive 
coupling between the probe and the oscillator coils, which can be rather weak depending 
on the probe orientation and size; e.g., the experiments in [8] could detect the probe only 
when it was less than 100 𝜇m away from the die.  
In contrast, power SCA attacks, which are more common in the literature [6], [11], 
are cheaper to implement and can be more effective (requiring fewer observations), 
especially when there is high information content in the observed signals, or equivalently, 
when the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) is high; e.g., when the target chip is dedicated to 
performing encryption operations and implements no countermeasures such as masking 
[9], [10] or hiding [11], [12] to obfuscate its power usage profile. Yet, power SCA attacks 
can be more easily countered and lose effectiveness while EM SCA attacks remain 
immune; e.g., when the encryption block is integrated in a chip with other modules that 
also consume power or if the chip’s power usage is intentionally obfuscated. While both 
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attack modalities are discussed and contrasted in this thesis, its main contribution is to 
increase the effectiveness of EM SCA attacks.  
1.1 GRANULARITY OF EM SCA ATTACKS 
Based on the type/amount/resolution of recovered information, EM SCA attacks 
can be grouped into two categories:  
Coarse-grained EM SCA attacks aim to recover the minimal amount of information 
necessary to neutralize the cryptographic protection (e.g., a secret key); they generally use 
larger probes, typically hand-held or fixed at a single position [7], [13], [14]. The probe 
dimensions in such attacks are generally comparable to the chip’s area such as the case in 
Fig. 1(a); occasionally, smaller probes are used [14]. Such EM SCA attacks are generally 
cheaper to implement and are similar to power SCA attacks as the signals detected by larger 
probes are a large aggregate of fields emanated from many sources distributed around the 
chip. As such, when the source of leakage is a small block of cells on a chip performing a 
critical computation, the information carrying signals emanated from such blocks can be 
below the sensor’s detection threshold because of two reasons: (i) the generated fields can 
be small in magnitude and (ii) sources other than the blocks of interest will contribute 
uncorrelated noise signals to the analysis. As a result, a large, potentially infeasible, number 
of observations may have to be taken in order to extract the information within the noisy 
signal. Even when coarse-grained EM SCA attacks can neutralize cryptography; they 
provide little ability to reduce the costs of future attacks, e.g., by spatially localizing 
information leakage. 
In contrast, fine-grained EM SCA attacks can not only neutralize cryptography, they 
provide additional information (such as best probe locations) that enable the marginal cost 
of measurements needed for future attacks on similar implementations to be reduced. They 
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generally use smaller probes as shown in Fig. 1(b) to identify and isolate vulnerable 
locations [4], [15] especially when information is leaking through logic blocks in fixed 
locations rather than distributed sources. On the one hand, they may require far few 
measurements than alternatives when the probes are in the vicinity of such locations; on 
the other hand, when the probes are far away from these locations, they may become even 
less effective than coarse-grained EM SCA attacks because the EM fields emanated from 
relevant sources decay rapidly with distance, reducing the SNR. Although fine-grained EM 
SCA attacks can re-use best measurement configurations in future attacks and amortize the 
costs over multiple EM SCA attacks, identifying such configurations in the first place can 
require a prohibitively large number of measurements.  
While a number of countermeasures can be deployed against EM SCA attacks, their 
effectiveness differ against the two categories of EM SCA attacks. Countermeasures for 
coarse-grained EM SCA attacks that modify aggregate signal values, such as masking [15], 
may not be able to withstand fine-grained EM SCA attacks; conversely, countermeasures 
for fine-grained EM SCA attacks, such as spatially randomized dataflow [16], may fail to 
defend against coarse-grained EM SCA attacks. In general, countermeasures for fine-
grained EM SCA attacks are more difficult to implement and add major overheads to the 
design.  
This thesis focuses on fine-grained EM SCA attacks. It presents a protocol to reduce 
the number of measurements needed for fine-grained EM SCA attacks; experiments on 
chips implementing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm achieve a 
reduction of ~20× to ~25× in measurement time. The algorithm also achieves a reduction 
of ~30× in total memory required for data storage. Although the proposed measurement 
protocol increases the effectiveness of fine-grained EM SCA attacks, the same protocol 
and the detailed explanations in this thesis can also be used to design better 
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countermeasures against fine-grained EM SCA attacks or, at least, more rapidly test the 
effectiveness of existing countermeasures.  
The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 2 reviews AES and its vulnerability 
to various SCA attacks; it also presents the SCA attack flow and the instruments used to 
affect fine-grained EM SCA attacks in later chapters. Chapter 3 discusses the variation in 
information leakage with different parameters and presents a protocol to search for optimal 
attack configurations as a combination of these parameters. Chapter 4 details the procedure 
for one experiment based on the proposed protocol along with an analysis of costs and 
trade-offs. Chapter 5 presents experiments which cover a wide range of parameters and 
concludes by providing the ideal attack configurations for two target chips based on these 
experiments.  Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of results and contribution of 
this thesis along with future work.  
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Chapter 2:  Background  
This chapter presents an overview of the AES algorithm, the principles of EM SCA 
attacks for recovering secret information, and the terminology that is used throughout the 
thesis. Section 2.1 details the operation of AES and its vulnerabilities to SCA attacks. 
Section 2.2 details an EM SCA attack that can recover the AES secret key by statistically 
analyzing observations of the ciphertext and the near-field EM emanations. Section 2.3 
presents a binary search algorithm to reduce computation time for the statistical analysis 
needed to enable adaptive EM SCA attacks. Section 2.4 describes the equipment used for 
the experiments presented in this thesis. 
2.1 THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD 
AES [17] is one of the most commonly used algorithms for symmetric 
cryptographic operations (encryption and decryption have the same key) in hardware 
 
Figure 2: Flowchart of the AES algorithm adopted from [19]. 
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security. It was established in 2001 by National Institute of Standards and Technology  
(NIST) [18]. The algorithm performs transformation operations on a given input (the 
“plaintext”) to generate an output (the “ciphertext”) using a secret key. There are 3 variants  
(AES-128, AES-192, AES-256) that use different length keys. All experiments in this 
thesis were performed on the 128-bit version of AES, where the key, plaintext, and 
ciphertext are 128 bits; the findings can be generalized to the more complex AES variants.  
The AES-128 algorithm requires 11 rounds of transformations to generate the 
ciphertext. The algorithm splits the input plaintext into 16 bytes, reshapes these bytes into 
a 4 × 4 matrix on which it performs various transformations. Each element in the matrix is 
labeled as 𝑆𝑟,𝑐 before transformation and 𝑆𝑟,𝑐
′
 after transformation, where 𝑟 is the row and 
𝑐 is the column index. The flowchart of AES-128 algorithm and a pictorial description of 
its transformations are shown in Fig. 2. Every round of AES uses a separate key; these are 
derived from the original secret key using Rijndael’s key schedule [17] that involve the 
following steps. 
• Split the original 16-byte secret key 𝐤0 = [𝑘0,1, 𝑘0,2, … , 𝑘0,16] to four 32-bit words 𝐰0 
to 𝐰3, where 𝐰0 = [𝑘0,1, 𝑘0,2, 𝑘0,3, 𝑘0,4], 𝐰1 = [𝑘0,5, 𝑘0,6, 𝑘0,7, 𝑘0,8], and so on. Since 
there are 11 rounds in the AES-128 algorithm (including round 0), a total of 44 words 
are generated in the key expansion. For the ith round, the 128-bit key 𝐤𝑖  will consist of 
the words 𝐰4𝑖 to 𝐰4𝑖+3, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 10. 
• To derive the i+1th round’s key 𝐤𝑖+1 from the ith round’s key 𝐤𝑖, perform the following 
operations  
o 𝐰4𝑖+4 =  𝑔(𝐰4𝑖+3)⨁𝐰4𝑖; 𝐰4𝑖+5 = 𝐰4𝑖+4⨁𝐰4𝑖+1; 𝐰4𝑖+6 = 𝐰4𝑖+5⨁𝐰4𝑖+2; 
𝐰4𝑖+7 = 𝐰4𝑖+6⨁𝐰4𝑖+3, 
where ⨁ is the XOR operator. 
• The 𝑔(𝐰) function performs 3 steps 
o Left circular rotate by one byte. 
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o Byte substitute each byte in the word using a 16×16 lookup table referred to as the 
substitution box or the S-box1. The S-box for AES is generated by first identifying 
multiplicative inverse of the input over Rijndael’s Galois Field [17] and then using 
a fixed affine transform. The standard S-box generated for AES2 [17] is shown in 
Fig. 3.  
o XOR the word generated from the result of the S-box with a round constant Rcon[i] 
= (RC[i],0016,0016,0016), which changes the first byte of the word. Here, RC follows 
the recursion RC[i] = 0216 × RC[i − 1] and RC[1] = 0116.  
Once all the keys 𝐤0, 𝐤1, ⋯ , 𝐤10 are generated, the AES encryption can be performed. In 
the first step (round 0) of AES, the plaintext is loaded to the state register; this is followed 
by a bitwise XOR of the plaintext and the original secret key (Fig. 2). For the subsequent 
9 rounds, four operations are performed: 
• SubBytes – Each byte in the matrix is replaced by another byte using S-boxes for 
substitution. There are 16 S-boxes used for encryption operations in the AES 
implementation used in this thesis; each S-box is used to process one byte in parallel/in 
the same clock cycle. This step makes the algorithm non-linear, i.e., there is no 
algebraic relation between the ciphertext and the plaintext. 
• ShiftRows – Each row of the 4×4 matrix undergoes a cyclic shift with a fixed offset. 
The first row does not shift, the second row shifts left by one position, the third row by 
two positions, and the fourth row by three positions. 
• MixColumns – Byte entries of each column are mixed using a linear transformation. 
The resulting output column is a product of the input column and a fixed polynomial. 
ShiftRows and MixColumns provide diffusion to the cipher, i.e, they ‘misplace’ data 
in the matrix while the SubBytes step ‘replaces’ data in the matrix3. 
 
1 S-boxes are generally used in cryptography for replacing data in the cipher and strengthening encryption. 
2 Custom S-boxes may be generated by modifying affine transforms. 
3 In cryptographic terms, ‘misplacing’ shuffles the existing data while ‘replacing’ substitutes existing data. 
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• AddRoundKey – Bitwise XOR operation are performed between the key generated by 
the key expansion for that round and output from the MixColumns stage. 
The final step (round 10) performs SubBytes, ShiftRows, and AddRoundKey operations 
and skips the MixColumns operation. After the final round, the ciphertext is available in 
the state register from which it is read out and replaced by the next plaintext. Attackers are 
assumed to have access to the ciphertexts and aim to extract the plaintexts.  
A well-known vulnerability of AES is the data-dependency of side-channel signals 
during the last round; as discussed in the next section, SCA attacks can exploit this 
vulnerability to recover the final key 𝐤10. Using inverse operations of the key schedule, the 
first key 𝐤0, which is also the key used for decryption, can be recovered from  𝐤10. 
Therefore, all the observed ciphertexts can be decrypted to extract the protected plaintexts. 
 
 
Figure 3:  The standard S-box used in AES-128 [17] is a 16 × 16 lookup table. To replace the byte 
1b16, the byte at row 1 and column b (the byte af16) is selected. 
2.2 SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS ATTACK MECHANISM  
SCA attacks extract keys by establishing statistical relations between the observed 
output of the encryption and measured physical signals (henceforth referred to as traces) 
using a hypothetical model [19]. Correlation-based attacks typically use one of three 
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models [11]: Zero Value4, Hamming Weight5, and Hamming Distance6 models. The Zero 
Value model assumes the power consumption for evaluating ‘0’ valued data is less than 
that for other data values. The Hamming Weight model assumes that circuits evaluating 
more ‘1’s than ‘0’s draw more power. The Hamming Distance model requires knowledge 
of the preceding and current state of a circuit; it evaluates the power based on the number 
of transitions between them. Hamming Distance between the outputs of the last two stages 
of AES represents switching in the CMOS logic, which can be tied to dynamic power 
consumption and emanated fields. Therefore, SCA attacks on AES performed in this thesis 
use the Hamming Distance model. 
In the final round of AES, apart from the ShiftRows operation, the byte locations 
in the 4×4 matrix do not change. ShiftRows employs fixed rotations and can be easily 
inverted by performing a rotate in the opposite direction. As a result, after accounting for 
the ShiftRows step, each element in the matrix can be processed separately and the SCA 
attack can be split into 16 individual attacks, one for each byte. With 256 possible guesses 
per byte, the final key 𝐤10 = [𝑘10,1, 𝑘10,2, … , 𝑘10,16] can be searched byte-by-byte within 
a space of 212 possible values in sharp contrast to the 2128  values that a brute-force attack 
on the entire 16-byte key would have to evaluate. A detailed description of the attack 
follows. 
The attack flow used throughout this thesis is shown in Fig. 4. Given a ciphertext, 
the output of the penultimate stage of AES can be deduced correctly by inverting the 
operations in the final AES round—provided the correct final key value 𝐤10 is used in the 
inversion. Because there are 28 possible values for each byte 𝑏 ∈ {1,⋯ ,16} of the final 
key, 256 guesses 𝑘0
10,𝑏 ,⋯ , 𝑘255
10,𝑏
 are made and 256 possible values are generated for each 
byte 𝑏 of the penultimate round’s output (the previous state of the register in Fig. 3). Then, 
the Hamming Distances between the guessed output of the penultimate round and the 
 
4 Zero Value assigns zero to ‘0’ valued results and one to all other values. It is useful to discern data values 
protected by multiplicative operations, as ‘0’ multiplied by any number would give ‘0’.   
5 Hamming Weight is the number of ‘1’s in a binary number; e.g., Hamming Weight of 11002 is 2.  
6 Hamming Distance is the number of transitions between 0s and 1s in two binary numbers; e.g., the 
Hamming Distance between 10012 and 01112 is 3. 
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ciphertext are calculated
7
. The calculation is repeated for each of the 𝑁e ciphertexts8, 
forming 256 sets that each contain 𝑁e Hamming Distances. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Side-channel analysis (SCA) attack flow [20]. 
To identify which of the 256 guessed keys 𝑘𝑔
10,𝑏
 is the correct guess for byte 𝑏 of 
the final key, each set of Hamming distances is correlated with the set of measured signals 
(traces) that contains 𝑁tr traces recorded during AES. Specifically, the Pearson Correlation 
 
7 It is important to note that this calculation is performed using only one byte of the ciphertext and guessed 
output. Accounting for the ShiftRows operation, byte 𝑏 of the key encrypts one byte of the ciphertext 
following a one-to-one relation with the set {1,6,11,16,5,10,15,4,9,14,3,8,13,2,7,12}, e.g., bytes 𝑏=1, 𝑏=2, 
and 𝑏=3 of the key encrypt bytes 1, 6, and 11 of the ciphertext. 
8 For simplicity, encryptions/decryptions were always performed on the same group of 𝑁e plaintexts 
throughout the thesis; these were generated using a pseudorandom generator. 
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Distinguisher is used with 𝑛tr of these traces (for 1 ≤ 𝑛tr ≤ 𝑁e)9. Let 𝜌𝑔
𝑏(𝑡, 𝑛tr) denote the 
correlation computed using set 𝑔 ∈ {0,⋯ ,255} of Hamming Distances, which corresponds 
to the guess 𝑘𝑔
10,𝑏
 for the key byte 𝑘10,𝑏; the correlation is a function of time and the number 
of traces used. The maximum value of the correlation over all time instants is denoted as 
𝜌𝑔
𝑏,max(𝑛tr) = max
𝑡
𝜌𝑔
𝑏(𝑡, 𝑛tr) 
It should be noted that the measured signals are discrete samples of the underlying 
functions; thus, 𝜌𝑔
𝑏 are computed at 𝑁pts time instances 𝑡0 + {0, ∆𝑡, ⋯,(𝑁pts − 1)∆𝑡}, 
where 𝑡0 represents the start time of the final AES round, ∆𝑡 = 1/𝑓s is the time-step size, 
and 𝑓s is the sampling rate used by the oscilloscope. An example of the correlation 
coefficients are shown in Fig. 5 for the scenario detailed in Section 3.1 with the probe 
located at (10.8,9,0) mm. 
       
Figure 5:  Correlation coefficients for byte 1. Left: The coefficient for the correct guess (𝒌10,1 = 19) 
and an incorrect guess (𝒌10,1 = 0) found using 𝑛tr = 5000 traces. Right: Maximum value 
of the coefficient for all 256 guesses when using different number of traces. Coefficients for 
the 255 incorrect guesses (gray) and the correct guess (blue) are shown along with the 
confidence threshold (red). Extracting byte 1 of the final key required at least ~2300 
encryptions to be observed in this measurement configuration. 
 
9 It is common to observe multiple traces in fine-grained EM SCA attacks for each encryption using different 
measurement configurations; e.g., using different probe locations or orientations. In these cases, the total 
number of traces observed is often much larger than the number of encryptions, i.e., 𝑁tr ≫ 𝑁e. Here, it is 
assumed that exactly one trace is collected in each measurement configuration per encryption (𝑁e traces per 
configuration) and that these sub-sets of 𝑁e traces are used independently (one sub-set at a time) in the 
Pearson Correlation Distinguisher; thus, at most 𝑁e traces are used to compute correlation. 
 13 
When the maximum correlation coefficient for one of the 256 sets differs from 
those of the other sets beyond a threshold value, the guessed value of the key byte that was 
used to generate the outlier set is considered to be 𝑘10,𝑏, the correct value of byte 𝑏 of the 
final key. In this thesis, the specific criteria used to identify the outlier set is that the null 
hypothesis 
                                                        𝜌𝑔
𝑏,max(𝑛tr) = 0,                                                          (2.1)    
must be valid with a confidence, α, of 99.99% [21] and the set for which this hypothesis is 
rejected is the outlier set (Fig. 5). A threshold is used to perform hypothesis testing and 
identify the correct guess; specifically  
                                             𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 (𝑛tr) =
𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑣(1 − 𝛼, 𝑛tr)
√𝑛tr − 3
 ,                                  (2.2) 
where 𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑣 function denotes the inverse t-distribution function used for statistical analysis 
[11]. The minimum number of traces for which the correlation is above this threshold, is 
denoted as the measurements to disclosure (MTD), which is the metric used in this thesis 
for judging SCA attacks. The MTD for byte 𝑏 of the final key (𝑘10,𝑏) is given by 
[𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 , 𝑔] =  min
𝑛tr
 [𝑛tr, 𝑔] s. t.  𝜌𝑔
𝑏,max(𝑛tr) >  𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 (𝑛tr),   (2.3)  
MTD is dictated by the measurement configuration as detailed in Chapter 3.  
Once the first byte 𝑘10,0 of the final key is recovered, the procedure is repeated until 
all 16 bytes of the final key 𝐤10 are decoded. Then, the first key  𝐤0 is found by inverting 
Rijndael’s key schedule. This method for breaking AES is commonly used for power, 
coarse-grained, and fine-grained EM SCA attacks. To differentiate between the power and 
EM side-channels, the terms Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) and Correlation EM 
Analysis (CEMA) are used. Power SCA and coarse-grained EM SCA attacks generally 
recover all bytes using a single set of 𝑁tr = 𝑁e observed traces; each trace is an aggregate 
of signals generated by all sources on the chip. In contrast, fine-grained EM SCA attacks 
can collect multiple sets of traces using different probe positions/orientations and can use 
a different sub-set of traces to extract each byte of the final key. Indeed, previous research 
on fine-grained EM SCA attacks shows that information leakage in AES can be localized 
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near S-boxes [15], [22]; more specifically, the traces observed near an S-box processing a 
particular byte correlate strongly with the key byte used for encrypting it. As such, when 
EM probes are positioned close to these information leaking locations, the final key bytes 
can be recovered by observing fewer encryptions, i.e., such measurement configurations 
have smaller MTDs. Identifying measurement configurations that yield a small MTD for 
each byte reduces the cost of future attacks. Various methods to identify these 
configurations, including their costs, are detailed in Chapter 3 
2.3 BINARY SEARCH ALGORITHM FOR FINDING MTD 
Computing the Pearson correlation coefficient 𝜌𝑔
𝑏,𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑛tr) requires 
𝑂(𝑁pts𝑛tr) operations. The direct method to identify 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏, using (2.3), is to re-compute 
the correlation coefficients as the number of traces 𝑛tr decreases from 𝑁e to 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏; this 
can require anywhere from 𝑂(𝑁pts𝑁e) to 𝑂(𝑁pts𝑁e
2) operations depending on 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏. 
Clearly, this naïve approach to finding 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏  can quickly become a computational 
bottleneck and handicap the adaptive acquisition protocol in Chapter 3 that requires finding 
𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 at each scan.  
To accelerate the search for 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 a binary search algorithm is used:  
1. Compute 𝜌𝑔
𝑏,max
(𝑁e) using all 𝑁e traces. If the threshold for null hypothesis 
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝑁e) is crossed, then 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 ≤ 𝑁e  and step 2 is performed; otherwise, 
𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 > 𝑁e and more encryptions must be observed to be able to extract byte 𝑏. 
2. Set 𝑛tr
start = 1 and 𝑛tr
end = 𝑁e; repeat the following until the stopping criterion is 
met. 
o Calculate the correlation 𝜌𝑔
𝑏,max
(𝑛tr
middle) using only the traces 1,2,⋯,𝑛tr
middle, 
where 𝑛tr
middle = ⌊(𝑛tr
start + 𝑛tr
end)/2⌋ and ⌊𝑥⌋ is the largest integer less than or 
equal to 𝑥.  
o If 𝜌𝑔
𝑏,max(𝑛tr
middle) > 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝑛tr
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒), then 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 ≤ 𝑛tr
middle; set 𝑛tr
start =
𝑛tr
start and 𝑛tr
end = 𝑛tr
middle. Otherwise, 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 ≥ 𝑛tr
middle; set 𝑛tr
start = 𝑛tr
middle 
and 𝑛tr
end = 𝑛tr
end. 
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o If 𝑛tr
end − 𝑛tr
start ≤ 10, set 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏=⌊(𝑛tr
start + 𝑛tr
end)/2⌋ and stop; otherwise, 
repeat the above steps. 
For example, in Fig. 5, 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 = 2300 and 𝑁e= 5000 encryptions are observed, the 
correlation for the correct guess will be evaluated for 5000 (pass), 2500 (pass), 1250 (fail), 
1875 (fail), 2187 (fail), 2343 (pass), 2265 (fail), 2304 (pass), 2285 (fail), and 2294 (fail); 
the method yields 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 = 2299. This algorithm finds 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 within ∓5 in 
𝑂(𝑁pts𝑁e log2𝑁e) operations. 
2.4 MEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT 
Performing fine-grained EM SCA attacks requires the use of precise equipment for 
recording traces and positioning probes. Choice of equipment plays an important role in 
the time required to perform the attacks as shown in Section 5.1. This section describes the 
equipment used in the experimental setup – EM probes, an oscilloscope, target chips, and 
a probe positioner. Various properties of these components that impact EM SCA attacks 
are presented.  
2.4.1 EM Probes 
EM probes (shown in Fig. 6) used in the experiments described in this thesis are H-
field probes from Langer (LF-R and LF-U probe set) [23] of 1 mm, 10 mm, and 25 mm 
diameters. The voltage detected by a probe p of surface 𝑆𝑝 that is oriented in ?̂? direction is 
given by Faraday’s Law: 
                                        𝑉𝑝
𝑜(𝑡) = −
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
∬ 𝜇?⃗? 𝑆𝑝
(𝑟 , 𝑡) ∙ ?̂?𝑑𝑠                                (2.4) 
which shows the dependence of observed voltages (traces) on probe size, orientation, and 
position. The voltages detected near the target chips in this thesis by the smallest probe had 
magnitudes ~100 µV. Typical oscilloscopes (Fig. 7) can detect down to a minimum of 
~400 µV and signals must be on the order of ~1 mV to limit the effect of quantization error. 
A 30-dB pre-amplifier [24] (Fig. 6) was used in conjunction with all probes to ameliorate 
this issue but using an amplifier adds extra noise that degrades SNR.  
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Figure 6: H-field probes of different sizes from Langer [23] (left) and a 30-dB pre-amplifier [24] 
(right). 
2.4.2 Oscilloscopes 
Keysight Infiniivision X-series (MSO-X 3024A) [25] and Infiniium S-series 
(MSO-S104A) [26] oscilloscopes (Fig. 7) were used for data collection. Data capture by 
the oscilloscope and transferring it to a computer is a major component of the measurement 
cost (see Section 3.7) for EM SCA attacks. The oscilloscopes and computer communicate 
through a USB interface controlled using Python’s virtual instrumentation library. 
 
Figure 7: Keysight’s Infiniivision scope [25] (left) performs a single measurement in every 
acquisition cycle while the Infiniium scope [26] (right) captures upto 4096 signals per 
acquisition cycle making experiments significantly faster. 
 17 
Most modern oscilloscopes have a feature called segmented memory to capture 
multiple traces in a single acquisition; e.g., an Infiniium S-series oscilloscope can collect 
up to 4096 segments before data needs to be saved. Older oscilloscopes, such as the 
Infiniivision X-series, may not have this feature resulting in capture and transfer of a single 
trace at a time. Typically, the time required to transfer the data is a major bottleneck in 
acquisition compared to the time required to capture it; thus, having to perform many 
transfers increases the measurement time significantly; see Section 3.7.  
2.4.3 Target Chips and Boards 
The experiments reported in this thesis were performed on a ChipWhisperer [27] 
board with an Artix-7 chip and a Sakura-G [28] board that has a Spartan-6 chip (Fig. 8). 
Opensource Verilog implementations of AES [28], [29] were deployed on these chips and 
Python’s serial interface library was used to control their USB interface. The Sakura-G and 
ChipWhisperer were operated at a clock frequency (denoted as 𝑓clk) of 6 MHz and 50 MHz 
in all the reported experiments, respectively. Both boards have start and end signals 
mapped to the IO pins to trigger the oscilloscope for data capture. 
 
  
Figure 8: The target boards. CW305 from ChipWhisperer [27] (left) with an Artix-7 chip and the 
Sakura-G board  [28] (right) with a Spartan 6 chip. 
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2.4.4 Probe Positioner 
A 3-D probe station from Riscure [30] was used to position the probes within a ±2.5 
µm tolerance above target chips. The station can be controlled through a USB interface and 
Python’s Trinamic Motor Control Library (TMCL), which can access the motors 
responsible for positioning. The probe can be moved within a range of 40 mm in 3 
directions. The station has a mounting apparatus to keep the target affixed (Fig. 9).  
All the equipment used in the measurements and a typical measurement setup used 
to perform the experiments in this thesis are shown in Fig. 9. 
      
Figure 9: Probe positioner along with mounting apparatus from Riscure [30] (left) and the experiment 
setup with all components connected [20]. 
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Chapter 3:  Acquisition Protocols for Fine-Grained EM SCA Attacks   
Information recovery in EM SCA attacks depends on a number of measurement 
parameters; in particular, as shown in (2.4), the probe voltage depends on the probe's size 
as well as its location and orientation relative to the chip. The impact of these parameters 
on information recovery is discussed in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 discusses the search space 
of configurations for EM SCA attacks. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 present two possible methods 
for performing fine-grained EM SCA attacks within this search space. Sections 3.5 details 
the associated costs and trade-offs for the presented methods while Sections 3.6–3.8 focus 
on time taken to perform measurements. Section 3.9 details storage requirements for 
collecting the data. 
Figure 10: Spatial distribution of the probe voltage observed at time 6 ns during the final round of AES 
(left) and the temporal distribution (right) observed at position (9.7,7.95,0) mm. Here, an x-
oriented probe of 1-mm radius was used to scan 181×181 locations just above the 
ChipWhisperer target chip. 
3.1 IMPACT OF PROBE PARAMETERS ON INFORMATION RECOVERY 
This section details the dependence of information recovery on various probe 
parameters; specifically, the probe’s location, height, size, and orientation. In the 
                    
Fig. 10.  
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following, the case shown in Fig. 10 is chosen as a reference scenario10 for recovering byte 
𝑏 = 1 of the final key of AES. Then, the impact of probe parameters on information 
recovery is studied by changing one probe parameter at a time. 
Figure 11: CEMA results for key byte b = 1 using an x- oriented probe. Left: The probe is centered at 
(9.7,7.95,0) mm (the reference scenario). Right: The probe is centered at (10.8,9,0) mm. 
First, the EM SCA attack detailed in Chapter 2 was performed at two probe 
locations separated by a distance of ~2 mm; the analysis results are shown in Fig. 11. While 
the EM SCA attack successfully found the correct value of the key byte in both cases, 
~4.3× more encryptions had to be observed compared to the baseline case when the probe 
was shifted ~2 mm in the x-y plane, demonstrating the sensitivity of information recovery 
to probe positioning. It is also worth observing that probe locations that result in higher 
magnitudes of EM traces do not necessarily recover information fastest. For this example, 
the baseline case had a peak-to-peak probe voltage of ~80 mV, whereas the second location 
had a peak-to-peak probe voltage of ~100 mV. This demonstrates that the MTD using a 
given measurement configuration depends on not the magnitudes of the traces but their 
SNR, i.e., how strongly the traces are correlated to the Hamming Distances between the 
ciphertext and the penultimate round’s output.  
 
10 The case with the probe at (9.7,7.95,0) mm is an optimal configuration to recover 𝒌10,1 for the 
ChipWhisperer board [20] (see Section 5.6). 
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Next, the probe was shifted above the chip surface. The observed probe voltages at 
time 6 ns are plotted as a function of probe position in Fig. 12(b) when the probe was 2.5 
mm above the chip surface. Comparing to Fig. 12(a) shows that the magnitudes of probe 
voltages were generally lower when the probe was farther away from the chip, as should 
be expected because EM fields decay with distance. The EM SCA attack when the probe 
was at the same x-y position as the baseline case succeeded; yet, ~4.5× more encryptions 
had to be observed compared to the baseline case when the probe was shifted 2.5 mm above 
the chip surface, once again demonstrating the sensitivity of information recovery to probe  
Figure 12: Spatial distribution of probe voltage at 6 ns during the final round of AES for various 
configurations. EM SCA results for these configurations resulted in 𝑀𝑇𝐷1 of (a) 540 at 
(9.7,7.95,0) mm (the  reference scenario), (b) 2400 at (9.7,7.95,2.5) mm, (c) 3000 at 
(9.7,7.95,0) mm, and (d) greater than 5000 at (9.7,7.95,0) mm. 
                      
(a) x-oriented, 1-mm radius, 0-mm height                  (c) x-oriented, 10-mm radius, 0-mm height 
                
(b) x-oriented, 1-mm radius, 2.5-mm height               (d) y-oriented, 1-mm radius, 0-mm height 
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positioning. 
Next, a larger probe was used. The observed probe voltages at time 6 ns are plotted 
in Fig. 12(c) for a 10-mm radius probe. Compared to Fig. 12(a), which was generated by a 
1-mm radius probe, the sensitivity to probe position/resolution were reduced, as should be 
expected: the 10-mm probe integrates fields over a larger area. The EM SCA attack when 
the probe was at the same x-y position as the baseline case succeeded but using the 10-mm 
radius probe required ~5.5× more encryptions to be observed compared to the 1-mm 
radius case, indicating the differences between coarse-grained and fine-grained EM SCA 
attacks.  
3.2 THE 4-DIMENSIONAL SPACE OF CONFIGURATIONS 
As Section 3.1 demonstrates, fine-grained EM SCA attacks have a multi-
dimensional space of configurations that strongly impact their potency. This space of  
configurations must be searched to identify vulnerabilities of a cryptographic 
implementation and to find optimal EM SCA attack configurations. Assuming various 
probe parameters are pre-determined11, the space of configurations can be narrowed down 
to a 4-D space: the 2-D location of the probe on the plane of the chip, the probe orientation, 
and, importantly, the number of encryptions that should be observed at each position.  
3.3 EXHAUSTIVE 4-D ACQUISITION 
Current techniques employ full-chip scans [15], [21], [22]—typically with a small 
probe placed in single or multiple orientations searching in the x-y plane above the chip—
to identify configurations that minimize information recovery time. Such techniques can 
be considered exhaustive scans. For example, the encryption key leakage from an FPGA 
implementing AES was localized to a resolution of ~1 mm with a full-chip scan of the chip 
surface after de-capsulating the FPGA in [21]; this required collecting a total of ~1.7×106 
traces (27 × 27 locations, 3 orientations, and 800 traces per position). 
 
11 The size, bandwidth, electric- or magnetic-field type, maker, and model of a probe can be pre-determined. 
This thesis also assumes that the probe-height is also pre-determined and fixed; in particular, probe location 
is assumed to be just above the chip’s surface, denoted as 0 mm height. 
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Because information recovery in fine-grained EM SCA attacks is sensitive to minor 
changes in probe position, a large number of locations must be probed in order to find the 
best location for the attack. For example, consider an exhaustive scan of the ChipWhisperer 
target chip similar to that shown in Fig. 10, which shows results for one probe orientation 
and one encryption. Probing 181×181 locations (it is an 18 mm×18 mm chip) using 100-
µm spatial resolution, with two vertical orientations (probe face perpendicular to the chip), 
and observing 5000 encryptions per position would require the collection of ~3.3×108 
traces. Although it would yield the best EM SCA attack configuration, the exhaustive scan 
would be prohibitively time consuming to  implement; e.g., using the equipment available 
for this thesis, it would require ~1 month to perform the search (see Section 4.4). 
Techniques are needed to more rapidly search this space and find optimal solutions.   
3.4 ADAPTIVE ACQUISITION PROTOCOL 
One possible approach to explore the space of configurations is to use an adaptive 
search algorithm: perform multiple (increasingly localized) scans of the EM fields on the 
chip surface and make a locally optimal choice based on the EM SCA attack results to 
determine the next scan. Each scan can reduce the total MTD and thus the marginal cost of 
attacking similar implementations; in return for increasing the total cost of the search with 
that of the latest scan. 
The proposed algorithm divides the search into 2 phases. Phase I is a full-chip scan 
that aims to provide a reasonable starting point for subsequent scans. Phase II initially uses 
the best configurations provided by phase I—probe locations and orientations with the least 
MTD—and improves upon them by performing localized scans. It places constraints on 
the area and number of measurements per position to reduce number of measurements. 
This phase is performed for each of the 16 bytes independently. The two phases of the scan 
are detailed next.  
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3.4.1 Phase I : Full-Chip Scans 
In this phase, 𝑁scan
I  scans are performed over the entire area 𝐴 of the chip as the 
number of encryptions observed per position or the spatial resolution increases. In each 
scan 𝑠 = 1,… ,𝑁scan
I ,  𝑁e
𝑠,I encryptions are observed at 𝑁obs
𝑠,I
 probe locations above the chip 
using two (or if possible, three) orthogonal probe orientations. The probe locations are 
distributed uniformly over the chip surface; thus, 
                                                             𝑁obs
𝑠,I = 𝐴/(Δ𝑠,I)2 ,                                         (3.1) 
where Δ𝑠,I denotes the scan’s spatial resolution. The increasingly more costly scans are 
performed until CEMA can extract all 16 bytes of the secret key using the acquired signal 
traces. The extraction in early scans may fail for one or more bytes due to insufficient 
number of probe locations (𝑁obs
𝑠,I
) or encryptions observed per position (𝑁e
𝑠,I
); either one of 
these two parameters may be incremented from one scan to the next during phase I. The 
next phase of the protocol assumes that at the end of phase I each byte of the secret key 
can be extracted via CEMA of the signal traces from at least one probe position with at 
least one probe orientation. Phase I ends by identifying  
                                                  𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
0 = min
𝑙
min
𝑜
 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑁scan
I ,I(𝑜, 𝑙),                 (3.2) 
the minimum MTD over all measurement configurations from the last scan in phase I for 
each key byte b. Here and in the following, 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑠,I/II
(𝑜, 𝑙) denotes the MTD for key byte 
b when the traces are collected using probe orientation o at location 𝑙 in scan s of phase 
I/II. The optimal probe location (𝑥𝑏
opt,0
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,0
, 0) and orientation 𝑜𝑏
opt,0
 that corresponds 
to 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
0 is recorded for each byte 𝑏 = 1,⋯ ,16. 
3.4.2 Phase II : Byte-by-byte Optimization 
In this phase, 𝑁scan
II  scans are performed over progressively smaller areas of the 
chip as the number of encryptions observed per position decreases and the spatial resolution 
increases. Importantly, the localization is performed separately for each byte of the key, 
i.e., 16 different localizations are performed. In the following, Δ𝑠,II denotes the scan’s 
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spatial resolution (as the last scan of phase I is the starting resolution in phase II, 
 Δ0,II=Δ𝑁scan
I ,I). 
All the scans in phase II are performed independently for each key byte b using a 
single probe orientation based on the results of Phase I (𝑜𝑏
opt,0
); the scans are progressively 
constrained to within the 3Δ0,II×3Δ0,II square region centered at (𝑥𝑏
opt,0
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,0
). Each scan 
(s=1,…,𝑁scan
II ) is performed over the 3Δ𝑠−1,II × 3Δ𝑠−1,II area between the four corners 
(𝑥𝑏
opt,𝑠−1
± Δ𝑠−1,II, 𝑦𝑏
opt,𝑠−1
± Δ𝑠−1,II), i.e., the encryptions are observed at  
                                                         𝑁obs
𝑠,II = (3Δ𝑠−1,II/Δ𝑠,II)2                             (3.3) 
locations. It is important to emphasize that only 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑠−1 encryptions are observed at 
each location during scan s of phase II. To prepare for the next scan, the measurement 
configuration with the minimum MTD  
                                                 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑠 = min
𝑙
 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑠,II(𝑜𝑏
opt,0
, 𝑙)                             (3.4) 
is found and the corresponding optimal location (𝑥𝑏
opt,𝑠
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,𝑠
, 0) is identified and the next 
scan is performed. At the end of the last scan, a near-field measurement configuration 
{𝑥𝑏
opt,𝑁scan
II
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,𝑁scan
II
, 𝑜𝑏
opt,0
} is identified for each byte b. Using these configurations, the 
16 bytes of the final key of AES can be extracted from an identical chip by collecting only 
                                               𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑁scan
II
16
𝑏=1                              (3.5) 
signal traces. In other words, once the measurement configurations are identified at the end 
of phase II by the proposed approach, the additional cost of extracting AES keys from the 
same implementation is given by (3.5). 
3.5 ACQUISITION COST  
The costs of the exhaustive and adaptive acquisition protocols are detailed next. 
3.5.1 Exhaustive Acquisition 
The cost of exhaustive acquisition is simply the number of traces recorded, which 
is the product of number of measurements per position 𝑁e, the number of observer 
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positions 𝑁obs, and the number of orientations for which the measurements were taken. 
The acquisition cost for this approach is 
                                                  𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 2𝑁e𝑁obs                                                (3.6) 
Here and throughout this thesis, only 2 probe orientations (x and y) are considered because 
of equipment limitations.  
3.5.2 Adaptive Acquisition 
The cost for the adaptive protocol is the sum of the acquisition costs of the phase I 
scans (over the entire chip with all probe orientations) and phase II scans (focused on 
optimal locations for each byte). The cost of each scan is the number of traces recorded in 
that scan; thus, the total cost of the proposed adaptive acquisition approach is 
       𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 2𝑁e
𝑠,I𝑁obs
𝑠,I
𝑁scan
I
𝑠=1⏟        
phase I
 +∑ ∑ 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑠−1𝑁obs
𝑠,II
𝑁scan
II
𝑠=1
16
𝑏=1⏟              
phase II
                           (3.7) 
The first term is similar to the cost of the exhaustive scan in (3.6) as phase I also performs 
full-chip scans. The second term reflects the fact phase II scans use fixed probe orientations 
for each byte and observes fewer encryptions per position as the scans progress.    
3.6 ACQUISITION TIME 
The expressions in (3.6) and (3.7) give the number of traces collected for analysis. 
Depending on the measurement equipment, however, the acquisition times for collecting 
the same exact data may differ significantly. The acquisition time can be calculated from 
the number of traces recorded (given by equations (3.6) and (3.7)) by using six variables:  
(i) 𝑣pos: the speed of the probe positioner. 
(ii) 𝑁pts: the number of samples/datapoints collected per trace, which is dictated by 𝑓s the 
sampling rate used by the oscilloscope and 𝑓clk the clock frequency of the chip. As only 
the probe voltage during the final round of AES is stored, 𝑁pts = 𝑓s /𝑓clk. 
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(iii) 𝑁seg; the number of traces that the oscilloscope can capture/store in local storage (also 
known as deep memory) in a single acquisition. This depends on the available local 
memory12, the file format, and how many samples are collected per trace. 
(iv) 𝑇cap: the time needed to capture each trace and store it locally, which is dictated by the 
time it takes to perform the encryption (the 11 rounds of AES) and the time needed to 
load the plaintext, trigger the oscilloscope capture, and control the measurement 
equipment remotely from a computer.  
(v) The time needed to save the data remotely by storing it to an attached device or 
communicating it to a computer. For storing 𝑁 bytes of data, this time can be expressed 
as 𝑡lat + 𝑁𝑡𝑏𝑤, where 𝑡lat is the latency and 𝑡𝑏𝑤 the inverse of the data transfer rate. In 
practice, 𝑡lat is orders of magnitude larger than 𝑡𝑏𝑤. 
In the measurement setup used in this thesis, typical values of these parameters are in the 
range: 𝑣pos = 1.3 𝑚𝑚/𝑠,𝑁pts = 150 𝑡𝑜 600, 𝑁seg = 1 𝑜𝑟 4096, 𝑇cap = 0.7 𝑚𝑠, 𝑡lat =
3.5 𝑚𝑠 to 70 𝑚𝑠, and 𝑡𝑏𝑤 = 4 𝜇𝑠 𝑡𝑜 40 𝜇𝑠 
3.6.1 Exhaustive Acquisition 
The acquisition time required to perform exhaustive acquisition can be expressed 
as 
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 =  2 ⌈
𝑁e
𝑁seg
⌉𝑁obs𝑡lat
⏟          
𝑇save
+ (2𝑁e(𝑁pts𝑡bw + 𝑇cap) +
Δ𝑒𝑥ℎ
𝑣pos
)𝑁obs
⏟                      
𝑇collect
       (3.8) 
where ⌈𝑥⌉ is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x and Δ𝑒𝑥ℎ is the exhaustive scan’s 
spatial resolution. This expression follows from (3.6) and the above definitions. The first 
term is the bottleneck in the measurement setup used for this thesis; to emphasize this, it is 
denoted as  𝑇save and remainder is referred to as 𝑇collect in the following. The acquisition 
time is impacted by the oscilloscope model: Older models may not have the option of 
 
12Some oscilloscope models have no local storage space on the equipment and each measured trace replaces 
the previously measured trace; see Section 2.3.3. In this case, 𝑁seg = 1. 
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saving multiple traces and 𝑁seg = 1 in these cases. Therefore, 5000 measurements require 
5000 data transfers. Newer models can store multiple segments of data as they have larger 
memory storage. For example, if an oscilloscope can store 𝑁seg = 1000  segments and 
𝑁e = 5000 encryptions must be observed, then only 5 data transfers would be required. 
Section 5.1 shows a sample comparison of the two oscilloscopes models for a 
measurement. The last term in (3.8) is the total distance traversed during the scan divided 
by speed of the positioner. The formula is valid if the scan pattern ensures a single step-
size movement between each position.  
3.6.2 Adaptive Acquisition 
The total acquisition time for the adaptive acquisition is the sum of phase I and 
phase II acquisition times, which can be derived from (3.7). The time required to perform 
phase I can be expressed as 
 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒I
= ∑ 2⌈
𝑁e
𝑠,I
𝑁seg
⌉𝑁obs
𝑠,I 𝑡lat
⏟          
𝑇save
+ (2𝑁e
𝑠,I(𝑁pts𝑡bw + 𝑇cap) +
Δ𝑠,I
𝑣pos
)𝑁obs
𝑠,I
⏟                        
𝑇collect
,   (3.9)
𝑁scan
I
𝑠=1
 
and the time required for phase II is given by  
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒II = 
       ∑ ∑ ⌈
𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑠−1
𝑁seg
⌉𝑁obs
𝑠,II𝑡lat
⏟            
𝑇save
+ (𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑠−1(𝑁pts𝑡bw + 𝑇cap) +
Δ𝑠,II
𝑣pos
)𝑁obs
𝑠,II
⏟                          
𝑇collect
𝑁scan
II
𝑠=1
 
16
𝑏=1
 (3.10) 
3.7 ANALYSIS TIME  
It is important to consider the time required for the correlation analysis in EM SCA 
attacks as MTD calculations can be expensive; see Section 2.3. Let 𝑇anl denote the time 
needed for these computations; using the binary search algorithm in Section 2.3,  
                                              𝑇an𝑙 =  2𝑁obs𝑁pts𝑁e log2𝑁e × 𝑇flop,                                    (3.11) 
for the exhaustive acquisition and  
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            𝑇anl =
(
 
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 2𝑁obs
𝑠,I 𝑁pts𝑁e
𝑠,I log2𝑁e
𝑠,I
𝑁scan
I
𝑠=1⏟                  
phase I
 
+∑ ∑ 𝑁obs
𝑠,II𝑁pts𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑠−1 log2𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑠−1
𝑁scan
II
𝑠=1
16
𝑏=1⏟                            
phase II )
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑇flop                      (3.12) 
for the adaptive acquisition. Here, 𝑇flop denotes the time needed for 1 floating point 
operation. 
 
Figure 13: Timeline of steps for the exhaustive acquisition. Measurement, data transfer, and analysis 
steps are performed sequentially. 
3.8 TIMELINE 
The various steps of the measurements are visualized next by constructing 
timelines. 
3.8.1 Exhaustive Acquisition 
A sample timeline for the exhaustive acquisition approach is shown in Fig. 13. The 
capture, transfer, and analysis steps are performed sequentially. Typically, the latency in 
transferring data from local memory of the oscilloscope to remote storage the computer 
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(𝑇save) takes the longest time, whereas the rest of the time needed to collect the signals 
(𝑇collect) as well as the time needed to compute correlations, identify the outlier guess, and 
find MTD (𝑇anl) once the data is transferred to the computer are shorter.  
3.8.2 Adaptive Acquisition 
Fig. 14 shows a sample timeline for the adaptive acquisition method: In phase I, 
every scan depends on the analysis of the previous scan; the steps of each scan are 
performed sequentially and get progressively more expensive. In contrast, the data 
collection and transfer may run in parallel to the analysis for phase II because the 
correlation analysis for a byte can be performed independently from the same scan for 
another byte. Using the binary search algorithm in Section 2.3 to accelerate the analysis 
ensures that there is no lag between scans. Moreover, the acquisition times for each scan 
decrease in phase II because the number of encryptions observed decreases progressively.  
 
Figure 14: Timeline of steps for the adaptive acquisition approach. Measurement, data transfer, and 
analysis steps are performed in parallel for the byte-by-byte scans in phase II: The analysis 
needed before the next scan for each byte is performed while the signal capture and transfer 
is happening for the next byte. 
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3.9 STORAGE REQUIREMENTS 
The data transfer time 𝑇save and the analysis time 𝑇anl depend on the data size and 
storage formats. Typically, single precision floating point numbers in binary files are used 
to store the data. Apart from the acquired data, every such file has a 140 byte-length header 
storing information on sampling, ranges, resolution. etc.; moreover, 140 byte-length 
headers are also attached before every trace. While these have to be carefully parsed, they 
may be neglected for estimating storage requirements if 𝑁pts is sufficiently large, as is done 
next.  
To store all the data, the exhaustive scan uses files of size  
                                  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 =  2𝑁obs𝑁pts𝑁e × 4 bytes                                    (3.13) 
The adaptive acquisition does not require the data from the all the scans to be stored as the 
files for the previous scan can be discarded when the next scan is completed. Thus, the 
adaptive scan can use files that are at most of size 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = max
(
 
 
2𝑁obs
𝑁scan
I ,I
𝑁e
𝑁scan
I ,I
⏟          
phase I last scan
 ,∑𝑁obs
1,II𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
0
16
𝑏=1⏟          
phase II first scan )
 
 
𝑁pts × 4 bytes       (3.14) 
If all the data collected in all the scans were to be stored, the adaptive scan would require  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 =
(
 
 
∑ 2𝑁e
𝑠,I𝑁obs
𝑠,I
𝑁scan
I
𝑠=1⏟        
phase I
 +∑ ∑ 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
𝑠−1𝑁obs
𝑠,II
𝑁scan
II
𝑠=1
16
𝑏=1⏟              
phase II )
 
 
𝑁pts × 4 bytes (3.15) 
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Chapter 4:  Measurement Results—Baseline Scenario 
  
This chapter shows the data collected and analyzed at the various steps of the 
measurement protocol for a baseline scenario. Section 4.1 describes the measurement 
setup. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 show scan results for the two phases of the adaptive scan 
protocol. Section 4.4 details the acquisition cost and timeline for the measurement and 
compares it to the exhaustive acquisition approach. 
 
Figure 15: A diagram of the setup used for the measurements [20] and probe voltage observed at the 
center of the chip (9,9,0) mm, using this setup, in the last 2 rounds of AES. Each round 
begins at rising edge of clock (dashed) and the traces used in CEMA are only the ~166-ns 
wide signals that are captured during the 10th round. 
4.1 SETUP 
The measurements described in this chapter were performed on the Sakura board 
clocked at 𝑓clk = 6 MHz. The probe size is 1 mm and the probe’s tip touches the surface 
of the chip (Model no. LF-R 3). The Infiniium oscilloscope was used for measurements 
and the entire setup was controlled and automated with a Python script. The sampling rate 
𝑓𝑠 = 4 giga-samples/second (∆𝑡 = 0.25 ns). Fig. 15 shows a block diagram for the setup 
and the probe voltage, corresponding to one encryption, in the penultimate and final rounds 
of AES.  
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4.2 PHASE I 
Phase I starts with an initial guess of resolution and the number of encryptions that 
should be observed at each position. Here, one of two approaches, termed as the Fewer 
Encryptions High Resolution (FEHR) approach and the Many Encryptions Low Resolution 
(MELR) approach, may be adopted. For the FEHR approach, the higher initial resolution 
can help identify good attack locations with fewer traces, but at a higher phase I acquisition 
cost. A significant reduction in search area resulting from phase I, however, would mean 
fewer phase II scans, which may reduce the overall acquisition cost. On the other hand, the 
lower initial resolution scans in the MELR approach, with more measurements per  
 
Byte 
Orientation 
(o) 
𝑥𝑏
opt,0
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,0
(mm) 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
0
 Byte 
Orientation 
(o) 
𝑥𝑏
opt,0
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,0
(mm) 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
0 
1 
x 7.2,7.2 3120 9 
 
x 3.2,14.4 2370 
y 7.2,7.2 2480 y 10.8,10.8 1240 
2 
 
x 7.2,10.8 3430 
10 
 
x 7.2,7.2 2460 
y 
No Location 
Detected 
>5000 y 3.6,7.2 4220 
3 
x 7.2,7.2 2010 
11 
 
x 7.2,3.6 3100 
y 3.6,3.6 3180 y 
No Location 
Detected 
>5000 
4 
 
x 7.2,7.2 2320 12 
 
x 7.2,7.2 2640 
y 7.2,3.6 3220 y 7.2,3.6 3440 
5 
 
x 3.2,10.8 1640 
13 
 
x 7.2,14.4 2120 
y 3.2,10.8 2040 y 
No location 
Detected 
>5000 
6 
 
x 7.2,10.8 2480 14 
 
x 7.2,3.6 3990 
y 10.8,7.2 2980 y 3.6,7.2 3220 
7 
 
x 7.2,10.8 4460 15 
 
x 
No location 
Detected 
>5000 
y 7.2,3.6 3680 y 7.2,10.8 4660 
8 
 
x 7.2,7.2 2300 16 
 
x 
No location 
Detected 
>5000 
y 7.2,3.6 2620 y 3.6,7.2 3920 
 
Table 1: Phase I Results  
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Figure 16: Maps of 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 results in phase I for bytes 𝑏 ∈ {1,5,9,13} when the probe is x or y oriented. 
The most effective location above the chip and orientation for the probe is different for the 
different bytes of the AES key. Colorbars are logarithmic and limits are chosen such that 
the maximum and minimum values of MTD across all compared scans are covered and the 
variation between location with best MTD and surrounding locations are observed clearly. 
          
                              x-oriented probe                                                                 y-oriented probe 
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. 
position, are cheaper13 and likely to complete phase I with lower acquisition cost than the 
FEHR approach. The measurements reported in this chapter used the MELR approach for 
phase I. A FEHR version was also performed (Section 5.2). 
 
An initial resolution with 𝑁obs
1,I = 6 × 6 locations on the chip area (Δ1,I = 3 mm) 
and 𝑁e
1,I
=5000 measurements per position were chosen to perform the attack. Two scans 
(one with x- and one with y-oriented probe) were performed using these parameters. After 
the first scan, all bytes could be recovered for some combination of location and probe 
orientation, i.e., phase I could terminate with 𝑁scan
I = 1 scan. The optimal location 
(𝑥𝑏
opt,1
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,1
, 0) and minimum MTD for every byte in phase I are shown in Table 1, which 
highlights the probe orientation used in phase II. Results of phase I scans for select bytes 
are shown in Fig. 16. At the end of phase I, the marginal cost of breaking an identical 
implementation was ~4.4×104 measurements. Phase I required a total of 1.8×105 
measurements, ~3.5 hours acquisition time, and ~ 432 MB storage space. 
4.3 PHASE II 
Phase II starts with the optimal configurations identified in phase I, performs 
progressively constrained scans to refine the results, and reduces the number of traces 
observed in each scan as localization improves. Every scan of phase II observes the 
encryptions at 𝑁obs
𝑠,II = 11×11 locations; thus, the resolution increases 3× in each scan. Fig. 
17 shows the localization of the scans and the change in MTD as phase II progresses. It 
was found that the 3rd scan of phase II did not significantly improvement MTD and multiple 
locations with similar MTDs were observed for some bytes. Therefore, phase II was 
terminated 𝑁scan
II = 3 scans. Table 2 shows the optimal location and MTD after every scan 
for each bytes. Most bytes are found to be clustered in similar areas if the probe orientation 
used for attack is the same. At the end of phase II, the final marginal cost of breaking a 
 
13 Phase I cost increases quadratically with increasing resolution; see (3.7). 
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similar implementation was ~104 measurements. Phase II required a total of ~107 
measurements, ~24 hours acquisition time, and ~12 GB storage space for the first scan. 
 
 
Figure 17: Progression of 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 in phase II for byte 𝑏 ∈ {1,5,9,13}. The square region represents the 
area probed  in the next scan. The final scan does not significantly reduce the MTD further 
and multiple locations may have similar MTDs. 
MTD     
    
  
 
 
                       Phase I Final Scan        Phase II Scan 1               Phase II Scan 2                 Phase II Scan 3 
 
 
Byte 5
Byte 9
Byte 13
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Byte 
 
Orientation 
Scan 1 Scan 2 Scan 3 
𝑥𝑏
opt,1
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,1
 
(mm) 
𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
1
 𝑥𝑏
opt,2
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,2
 
 (mm) 
𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
2
 𝑥𝑏
opt,3
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,3
 
 (mm) 
𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
3
 
1 y 7.92,10.08 1440 7.9,9.78 780 7.68,9.78 480 
2 x 8.64,10.8 1820 8.84,10.8 910 8.9,10.8 850 
3 x 8.64,7.2 900 9.04,7.6 640 8.98,7.6 600 
4 x 8.64,7.92 1280 9.04,7.92 680 9.04,7.8 640 
5 x 1.44,10.8 1870 1.64,10.8 610 1.58,10.8 500 
6 x 9.36,7.92 820 9.16,7.92 620 9.16,7.92 610 
7 y 5.04,5.76 2200 5.44,5.56 950 5.56,5.56 490 
8 x 7.92,7.92 1000 8.32,7.92 800 8.32,7.92 800 
9 y 8.64,11.52 1240 9.36,11.52 590 9.36,11.52 600 
10 x 7.92,7.92 1920 8.12,7.92 540 8.12,7.98 510 
11 x 5.04,5.04 1440 5.44,5.44 920 5.44,5.56 740 
12 x 9.36,6.48 1560 9.36,6.88 920 9.36,7.02 710 
13 x 7.92,13.68 1590 7.72,13.48 580 7.9,13.42 420 
14 y 5.04,7.2 1700 5.44,7.6 630 5.5,7.36 460 
15 y 9.36,12.96 1550 9.36,13.08 1220 9.36,13.08 1220 
16 y 5.04,6.48 940 5.24,7.08 610 5.48,7.14 540 
Table 2: Phase II Results 
The configurations identified by this experiment may not represent the most 
optimal result, e.g., byte 15 did not show improved MTD after the 2nd scan of phase II (Fig. 
18), implying that the best attack location or orientation may be different.  
 
 Figure 18: Analysis for byte 15 shows minimal improvement in phase II 
        
  
            Phase I Final Scan                Phase II Scan 1                     Phase II Scan 2                    Phase II Scan 3 
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4.4 COST ANALYSIS AND TIMELINE 
Marginal cost and acquisition cost are calculated using the MTD values in Tables 
1 and 2 and (3.5) and (3.7); they are plotted in Fig. 19 with respect to the scan round. Fig. 
18 shows that the first scan of phase II is the costliest scan since it is performed for all 16 
bytes in contrast to phase I where a full-chip scan is performed for all bytes. Subsequent 
scans in phase II have lower costs due to the decrease in the encryptions 
observed/measurements recorded per position. Marginal cost reduces sharply after the first 
phase II scan and then converges after the second scan to ~104 measurements.   
           
Figure 19: Acquisition cost and marginal cost of the adaptive protocol as scans progress. The final 
marginal cost is ~4× lower than the initial marginal cost. 
Fig. 20 shows trade-off between marginal and acquisition cost. It also shows the 
expected cost of the exhaustive scan, which corresponds to the number of measurements 
required for probing 181 × 181 locations for 5000 encryptions and 2 orientations. Because 
this scan is impractical to implement, the marginal cost and the configurations that would 
be identified by the exhaustive scan are unknown and the exhaustive scan can potentially 
decrease the marginal cost further, but the gains are expected to be minor. The adaptive 
search acquired ~107 traces, which was ~30× fewer traces compared to the exhaustive scan.  
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Figure 20: Trade-off between the acquisition cost and the marginal cost of extracting AES key from an 
identical implementation. 
Timelines for both the adaptive and exhaustive acquisition can be constructed using 
(3.8)-(3.11). Phase I acquisition time was ~3.5 hrs. In phase II, measurements and analysis 
were performed simultaneously till byte 15 in the last scan. 𝑇save  for the oscilloscope 
scales with the number of traces observed and therefore acquisition time decreases with 
every scan. Total acquisition time for this experiment was ~ 28 hrs (Fig. 21). The expected 
timeline of the exhaustive acquisition (Fig. 22) shows the total acquisition time to be ~25× 
more, which is nearly a month. The maximum file-size requirement for the adaptive 
acquisition method is close to 12 GB for this experiment compared to the 750 GB that 
would be required by the exhaustive search. Storage with each scan is shown in Fig. 23. 
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Figure 21: Timeline of the adaptive acquisition. The total time taken for the experiment was ~28 hrs; 
about half of which was spent in the first scan of phase II.. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Timeline of the exhaustive scan with expected acquisition time close to 30 days. 
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Figure 23: Storage with each scan shows phase II scan 1 requiring maximum storage of ~12 GB. 
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Chapter 5:  Analyses of Attack Configurations 
  
This chapter presents a comparison of attack configurations with different 
oscilloscopes, different targets, approaches and configurations, and selects low-cost 
configurations for performing EM SCA attacks. Each section in this chapter observes the 
variation in information recovery by changing one parameter with respect to the baseline 
scenario in Chapter 4. Section 5.6 presents the best configurations to attack the target chips 
based on the experiments. Section 5.7 concludes with a comparison of the lowest cost 
needed to perform EM SCA attack and power SCA attack. 
5.1 INFINIIVISION VS INFINIIUM OSCILLOSCOPES 
 As discussed in Section 3.6, an oscilloscope’s save time and capture time have 
major influence on the total acquisition time for a measurement. The experiment performed 
in Chapter 4 used the Infiniium model; here, the experiment is repeated with the 
Infiniivision model. The Infiniivision oscilloscope cannot store more than one trace at a 
given time and therefore data needs to be transferred to the computer before the next 
encryption can be performed. This creates a major bottleneck because 𝑇save ≫ 𝑇collect.  
Table 3 compares the differences in acquisition time for phase I and phase II using these 
two oscilloscopes for 5000 measurements with 𝑁pts = 600.  
Oscilloscope 𝑇cap 
(ms) 
𝑡𝑏𝑤 
(μs) 
𝑡lat 
(ms) 
Max 
(𝑁seg) 
𝑣pos 
(mm/sec) 
Phase I 
time 
(hrs) 
Phase II 
time 
(hrs) 
Total 
time 
(hrs) 
Infiniivision 0.7 40 70 1 1.33 30.6 176.9 207.5 
Infiniium 0.7 4 3.5 4096 1.33 3.7 24.1 27.8 
Table 3: Times Required to Perform the Experiments  
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𝑡lat for the Infiniium oscilloscope, which is a major component of 𝑇save, is ~20× 
lower than the Infiniivision oscilloscope for the baseline case. However, since analysis time 
for both oscilloscopes are equal, using the Infiniium model requires ~8× less time than the 
Infiniivision model. Unless otherwise noted, the Infiniium model was used to collect the 
data in the following. 
5.2 SAKURA VS CHIPWHESPERER TARGETS 
It is necessary to ensure that the presented protocol can scale with shrinking 
technology nodes. The experiment performed in Chapter 4 is repeated for the 
ChipWhisperer board, which has a target chip manufactured at the 28 nm technology node 
(Sakura board has a 45 nm FPGA chip). 
Figure 24: Phase I and phase II analysis for byte 1 and 2 for the ChipWhisperer board.. 
Here, phase I started with the same initial condition used in the baseline  case, i.e. 
resolution of 𝑁obs
1,I
 = 6 × 6 divisions of the entire chip area and 𝑁e
1,I
=5000 measurements 
per position. However, this configuration failed to yield 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏 < 𝑁e
1,I
 for a few bytes. The 
         MTD            
 
 
> >
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number of locations was then increased to 𝑁obs
2,I
 = 11 × 11 keeping the measurements per 
positions at 𝑁e
2,I
=5000. This configuration succeeded for all bytes and phase I finished with 
𝑁scan
I = 2 scans. Analysis for bytes 1 and 2 are shown in Fig. 24. After identifying optimal 
configurations for all bytes, phase II was performed. The marginal cost of phase I was ~7 
× 104 measurements. Time taken to perform phase I was ~ 12 hours and the storage space 
required was ~ 3 GB. 
 
Figure 25: Comparison of marginal cost and acquisition cost of two targets. The Sakura board has 
lower marginal cost at a lower acquisition cost. 
Every scan of phase II observed the encryptions at 𝑁obs
𝑠,II = 11×11 locations. Phase 
II terminated at 𝑁scan
II = 3 scans and finished with a final marginal cost of ~ 1.2×104 
measurements at a total acquisition cost of ~107 measurements. The trade-off curves for 
the two targets is shown in Fig. 25. Phase I acquisition cost was significantly higher for the 
Chipwhisperer target which also had a much higher marginal cost at the end of phase I 
compared to the Sakura target. At the end of phase II, the Chipwhisperer target had ~1.2× 
higher marginal cost and ~1.5× higher overall acquisition cost. The timeline for this 
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experiment (Fig. 26) shows that total acquisition time was ~38 hrs. The maximum storage 
required for analysis is ~14 GB which is required for first scan of phase II. 
 
Figure 26: Timeline for the experiment on Chipwhisperer board. 
5.3 MELR APPROACH VS FEHR APPROACH 
As discussed in Section 4.2, there are two possible initial acquisition approaches—
MELR  and FEHR. The MELR approach was used in the baseline scenario and the FEHR 
approach is presented here. The FEHR approach started with an initial guess of 𝑁obs
1,I =
21 × 21 divisions of chip area and 𝑁e
1,I =500 measurements per probe position. The attack 
failed to extract the secret key for this scan and also the second scan with 𝑁obs
2,I =25×25 
locations. Following this, the number of measurements per position was increased by 500 
(𝑁e
3,I = 1000) and the third scan was performed using the same resolution as the second 
scan. This configuration yielded a successful acquisition and phase I terminated at 𝑁scan
I =
3 scans. Storage needed to complete phase I is ~ 3 GB. Although this approach is more 
likely to encounter locations with faster information recovery in phase I, it is also more 
expensive: The phase I acquisition cost for the FEHR scan was ~7× that of the MELR scan 
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for this target. At the end of phase I, the marginal cost was found to be ~1.3×104. For the 
FEHR approach, the area for first scan in phase II was ~6× smaller than the first scan of 
Figure 27: Phase I and phase II analysis for byte 1 for the MELR and FEHR. 
MELR approach. Therefore, the FEHR approach required only 𝑁scan
II = 2 scans to identify 
optimal configurations. Phase II analysis for byte 1 for both the approaches are shown in 
Fig. 27. The final configuration for byte 1 using both these approaches yield similar results, 
although this is not true for all bytes [20]. Finally, both approaches finished with a similar 
marginal cost: ~104 signal traces to extract the AES-128 key from this implementation as 
shown in Fig. 28, although the FEHR approach reached this marginal cost with ~1.25× 
fewer measurements. Total acquisition time for the FEHR approach was found to be ~ 22 
         
     
            Phase I Final Scan                  Phase II Scan 1                      Phase II Scan 2                       Phase II Scan 3          
     
              Phase I Final Scan                         Phase II Scan 1                      Phase II Scan 2 
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hours and the maximum file storage needed for first scan of phase II is ~3.7 GB which is 
~4× lower than the MELR approach. 
 
Figure 28: The cost tradeoff for the two different approaches used in phase I scan. 
5.4 VARIATION WITH PROBE HEIGHT 
This experiment was performed by raising the probe to– 2.5 mm and 5 mm above 
the chip surface. All heights were measured from probe tip to the surface. For distances 
greater than 5 mm, detected voltage levels are lower than the oscilloscope’s minimum 
resolution making it infeasible to perform the fine-grained EM SCA attack. Phase I 
configurations identified for the 0-mm height case, with 𝑁e
1,I = 5000 measurements and 
𝑁obs
1,I
 = 5 × 5 divisions of the entire chip area, succeeded for the 2.5 mm case but failed for 
the 5 mm case. The 5 mm case required increasing both number of traces to 𝑁e
3,I
=10000 
and resolution to 𝑁obs
3,I =  11 × 11 . Therefore, phase I acquisition costs for the 2.5 mm 
case and 0 mm case were the same, whereas that for the 5 mm case was higher. 
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Figure 29: Analysis shows difficulty in isolating information leaking locations as probe shifts further 
away. 
Phase II analysis (shown in Fig. 29) showed minimal improvement in MTD over 
phase I as the height increased. The scans also yielded different optimal locations for the 
EM SCA attack for different heights. The trade-off curves for the 3 heights (Fig. 30) show 
that both acquisition cost and marginal cost increase as the probe height increased. 
 
Figure 30: Marginal cost vs Acquisition cost for increasing probe height.. 
> > >>
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Although signal levels reduce, the main reason for degradation of marginal cost and 
increase in acquisition cost is the uncorrelated noise from background sources which have 
more influence as the probe shifts further away. In comparison with baseline, the 
acquisition time for the 2.5 mm case is ~2× slower and the 5 mm case is ~3× slower. 
Maximum file storage needed for the 2.5 mm case and the 5 mm case is found to be ~18 
GB and ~22 GB.    
5.5 VARIATION WITH PROBE SIZE 
This experiment used the probes with two probe sizes—10 mm and 25 mm with 
the tips of the probe touching the surface of the Sakura target. The largest probe could not 
complete phase I even after increasing the number of observers to 𝑁obs
4,I
 = 21 × 21 and 
measurements per position to 𝑁e
4,I
=10000.  Scan results for byte 1 using the 10 mm probe 
is shown in Fig. 31. The MTD does not improve significantly with each scan in comparison 
with the baseline results shown in chapter 4 where the 1 mm probe was used. The trade-
off curves comparing the two cases (Fig. 32) show the disadvantage of using larger probes 
for low resolution attacks, which is because of low SNR (See Section 3.1). Acquisition  
Figure 31: Scan results shown for byte 1 using a 10 mm probe for attack. 
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Figure 32: Trade-off curves show slower reduction in marginal cost with each scan for larger probe. 
time to perform EM SCA attack for the larger probe ~ 32 hours. Maximum storage for 
performing this attack is ~16 GB. 
5.6 FINAL CONFIGURATION FOR FINE-GRAINED EM SCA ATTACKS 
From experiments performed in this thesis, the smallest probe with the probe 
touching the surface of the chip shows the fastest recovery of key bytes from AES. The 
final configurations for the 1 mm probe at 0 mm height which were obtained for both the 
target chips using a combination of MELR and FEHR approach are given in Table 4 and 
Table 5. 
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Byt
e 
Orientation (o) 𝑥𝑏
opt,0
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,0
(mm) 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
0
 Byte 
Orientation 
(o) 
𝑥𝑏
opt,0
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,0
(mm) 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
0 
1 y 7.68,9.78 480 9 y 9.36,11.52 600 
2 x 8.9,11 640 10 x 8.12,7.98 510 
3 x 8.98,7.6 600 11 x 5.44,5.56 740 
4 x 9.04,7.8 640 12 x 9.36,7.02 710 
5 x 1.58,10.8 500 13 x 7.9,13.42 420 
6 x 9.16,7.92 610 14 y 5.5,7.36 460 
7 y 5.56,5.56 490 15 y 5.48,7.24 660 
8 x 8.32,7.92 800 16 y 5.48,7.14 540 
 
Table 4: Sakura Board Best EM SCA Attack Configurations 
 
Byte Orientation (o) 𝑥𝑏
opt,0
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,0
(mm) 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
0
 Byte Orientation (o) 𝑥𝑏
opt,0
, 𝑦𝑏
opt,0
(mm) 𝑚𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑏
0 
1 x 9.7,7.95 540 9 x 9.7,7.95 670 
2 y 8.9,10.8 760 10 x 9.7,7.95 710 
3 x 9.7,7.95 730 11 y 5.44,5.56 730 
4 x 9.7,7.95 680 12 x 9.36,7.02 580 
5 x 9.7,7.95 620 13 x 9.7,7.95 590 
6 y 9.16,7.92 610 14 y 5.5,7.36 790 
7 x 9.7,7.95 740 15 x 9.7,7.95 650 
8 y 8.32,7.92 620 16 x 9.7,7.95 610 
 
Table 5: Chipwhisperer Board Best EM SCA Attack Configurations 
The final key 𝒌10 was identified as 𝒌10 =[19, 17, 29, 127, 227, 148, 74, 23, 243, 7, 167, 
139, 77, 43, 48, 197]. Reversing the key schedule step, 𝒌0 =
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] which is the original AES key.  
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5.7 EM SCA VS POWER SCA ATTACK 
The power SCA attack followed the same procedure as the EM SCA attack except 
it is performed on a single set of 5000 traces collected by observing the VDD to GND drop 
during the final AES cycle. This measurement is available through a port on the Sakura 
board [28], the power SCA recovered all bytes with less than 2500 measurements; thus, 
the marginal cost for the power SCA attack was 2500 and the acquisition cost was only 
5000 measurements. Thus, the power SCA attack was ~2000× cheaper to implement with 
a marginal cost that was ~4× smaller compared to the fine-grained EM SCA attack 
described in this thesis. It is important to observe, however, that the chips were dedicated 
to performing only AES and no countermeasures were implemented; i.e., the best-case 
scenario for the power SCA attack. For example, the AES block can be integrated in a chip 
to encrypt data that is generated from other components and processes on the chip. 
 
Figure 33: Change in the marginal cost of power analysis compared to EM analysis as random 
Gaussian noise is added to the system. 
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Therefore, any analysis of the total power drawn would also include noise from 
these additional components and processes. In contrast, fine-grained EM SCA attacks has 
the potential to be less affected by these.  
To demonstrate the impact of the power drawn by background components on the 
effectiveness of the power SCA attack, a Gaussian random noise was added to the power 
trace and the marginal cost was observed as the noise signal’s strength was increased from 
noise of magnitude 100× lower than signal to noise level equal to signal. The results are 
plotted with respect to the SNR in Fig. 33, which shows that if the power drawn by the 
AES component is less than half the total power, the fine-grained EM attack has a lower 
marginal cost.  
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Chapter 6:  Conclusion and Future Work 
The thesis presented a measurement protocol that increases the effectiveness of 
fine-grained EM SCA attacks. It presented a detailed description of the EM SCA attack 
procedure for AES and then presented an adaptive protocol to effectively implement fine-
grained EM SCA attack. The proposed protocol is a greedy acquisition approach to search 
the space of possible configurations and identify optimal near-field measurement 
configurations for recovering AES keys. A baseline scenario using this measurement 
protocol was presented which showed significant speedup over the exhaustive acquisition 
approach in time and memory. Memory and cost would scale in proportion with key length 
for AES-192 and AES-256.  
Further, the protocol was put to test for a variety of different scenarios, including 
changing the chip/board, probes, and probe heights, and the optimal configurations were 
identified. The EM SCA attack was compared to the power SCA attack; while it was found 
that the fine-grained EM SCA attack was less effective for the baseline scenario even with 
the proposed protocol, the thesis indicates that very different countermeasures are needed 
for countering the two types of attacks and performing intentional or unintentional 
obfuscating operations during AES encryption may not be sufficient countermeasures for 
fine-grained EM SCA attacks.  
The proposed protocol is general enough to be used for other chips and boards 
implementing AES, and can also be adopted for other cryptographic algorithms. It can be 
improved further to reduce acquisition cost by reusing the data from previous scans to 
reduce the cost of each scan. The protocol will also be repeated with frequency domain 
analysis which may prove to be a more effective SCA attack.  
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